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Abstract 
 
People displaced by climate change and environmental disasters are currently not 
covered by international legal frameworks. There are three broad narratives applied in 
literature to discuss this multi-faceted issue, mainly environmental disruption and climate 
change, threat to human and national security, and damage and loss of livelihood and 
property. Mimicking these narratives, this study tests the affect of 4 different frames – 
Environmental Refugees, Political Refugees, Economic Refugees, and Refugees (control) 
on responsibility attribution and policy attitudes for people displaced by climate change. 
The study aims to investigate if certain frames garner more support than others. Through 
an online experimental design of 230 participants in the US, I also test to see if 
predispositions of individuals bias their attitudes. My results show that participants in 
general attribute more responsibility for the wellbeing of the refugees with the individual 
refugees themselves in comparison to responsibility with the international community. 
Further, across the frames, the participants expect the US government to take relatively 
lesser policy action for the refugees than the international community. This policy action 
is in the form of providing asylum status, safe housing, jobs and development aid for the 
refugees. I find that the frames significantly differ from the control, with the 
Environmental Refugees narrative gathering the least support. Predispositions of anti-
climate change perceptions, anti-immigration sentiments, previous experience with 
environmental disasters and political ideology significantly affect individual attitudes. 
The results are counter-intuitive to the expectation of the frames. The environmental 
narrative in particular is used by scholars to generate awareness and alarm for policy 
action, yet receives significantly lower support. These findings are suggestive of the 
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current global resistance to embrace environmental refugees within international legal 
frameworks. The study is embedded within attribution and issue framing theory. The 
paper builds on empirical evidence on experimental research and the environmental-
migration literature. 
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1-Introduction 
 
“Climate change is already triggering displacement and migration, as a result of 
increasingly intense weather events, rising sea levels, and accelerated environmental 
degradation. In the future, we may be facing an increase in population flows that the 
world is presently ill-equipped to tackle effectively” 
-International Organization for Migration (IOM 2012, pp.15) 
 
In 1991, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that one of the 
“gravest effects of climate change maybe those on human migration” (IPCC, 
1991,pp.103). The IPCC has predicted that by the turn of the century climate change 
would cause migration and displacement of 1.4 million people annually around the world 
(IPCC, 1990, pp.20). Recent global negotiations at the Conference of Parties (COP 19) at 
Warsaw reached a historic agreement on a “Loss and Damage Mechanism” to help 
developing countries cope with adverse impacts of climate change (UNFCCC, 2013, 
pp.1). Yet it remains unclear how environmental refugees and migrants will specifically 
benefit from this fund. Communities displaced by environmental change remain highly 
vulnerable populations, lacking international legal frameworks and policies for their 
protection.  
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has explicitly refused to 
expand their definition of ‘refugee’ to include people displaced by environmental factors 
(UNHCR, 2002). Although the term ‘environmental refugees’ is currently legally 
2 
 
meaningless (UNHCR, 1951) scholars, activists and policy makers continue to use the 
term to generate awareness for action (Morrissey, 2012; Norman. Myers, 1997, 2005; R. 
Reuveny, J.W. Maxwell, & Davis, 2011; Reuveny, 2007; Warner, 2011 and others). 
Many scholars propose the creation of a new category for environmental refugees and 
migrants (B. Docherty & Giannini, 2009; Betts, 2013; Biermann & Boas, 2007; François 
Gemenne, 2011). Others oppose both the creation of a new policy framework (McAdam, 
2011) and incorporations within existing frameworks (Bates, 2002; Black, 2001; Black et 
al., 2011; Castles, 2002).  
 
The plight of environmentally-displaced persons is currently discussed drawing on three 
board narratives mainly environmental disruption and climate change, threat to human 
and national security, and damage and loss of livelihood and property. Being a multi-
faceted issue, these narratives often overlap with other forms of population movement 
such as political refugees and economic migrants. Previous studies have analyzed, 
categorized and critiqued these narratives across various documents and media sources 
(Adger, A.B. Tor, B. Katrina, & Hanne, 2001; Bakewell, 2008; Bettini, 2013; C. 
Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; E. Piguet, A. Pécoud, & Guchteneire, 2011; Farbotko, 2005; 
Hartmann, 2010; J.S. Dryzek & Stevenson, 2012; K. O’Brien, S. Eriksen, L.P. Nygaard, 
& Schjolden, 2007; Methmann, 2010; N. Detraz & Betsill, 2009; E. Piguet, 2010; Etienne 
Piguet, 2013; R. Reuveny et al., 2011; Clionadh. Raleigh, 2011; C. Raleigh & Kniveton, 
2012; Reuveny, 2007; Risbey, 2008). While researchers have largely applied discourse 
analysis frameworks to deconstruct on-going debates, they have neglected the effect these 
narrative frames have on individual perceptions. Thus this study does not merely critique 
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existing narratives for environmental refugees, but rather demonstrates how alternative 
presentations of this growing problem affect attribution of responsibility and policy 
attitudes by individuals exposed to them.  
 
Mimicking on-going narratives, I apply experimental manipulation to evaluate impacts of 
different frames on individual perceptions. My empirical findings indicate that these 
alternative frames do in fact influence how individuals attribute responsibility and 
support policies for people displaced. Among the frames, constructions for climate 
change and environmental damage receive significantly lower support, being counter-
intuitive to the intensions of raising alarm for their cause. Participants with anti-climate 
change and anti-immigration sentiments are more likely to have reduced policy support, 
while those with prior experience with disasters increase their support. However, 
respondents who hold liberal ideologies are more willing to attribute responsibility to 
their own government and international community for the wellbeing of refugees. The 
effect of the different frames is thus altered by predispositions of the respondents. These 
findings are embedded within issue framing and attribution theory and emphasize the 
significance frames have in the context of individual attitudes.  
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2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
2.1 Issue Framing  
 
Framing of a social problem affects the formulation of individual attitudes and opinions. 
A single issue can be discussed or defined in several ways making certain facts and 
values more prominent than others (D. Chong & J. N. Druckman, 2007; Entman, 1993; 
Iyengar, 1989a; William G. Jacoby, 2000). They activate unequal emphasis on specific 
aspects by placing varying weights on features of the issue (Zaller & Feldman, 1992). 
When exposed to competing frames, citizens organize their attitudes by a selective 
process of accepting and rejecting alternatives, thereby forming judgments (D. Chong & 
J. N. Druckman, 2007; Sniderman, 1993). In other words, a particular interpretation of an 
issue impacts thinking among people exposed to that frame, also known as the ‘framing 
effect’ (D. Chong & J. N. Druckman, 2007; Sniderman, 1993; Zaller & Feldman, 1992, 
Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). 
 
By influencing the causal factors underlying opinions on an issue, issue framing tap 
separate elements within a person’s belief system and values (Donald R. Kinder & 
Sanders, 1990). Individuals place “a dimension” (Riker, 1986), a consideration (Zaller & 
Feldman, 1992), a value (Sniderman, 1993), or a belief (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980)” in 
forming an attitude on the issue (Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, pp.105). 
The framing effect may thus either make a new belief salient or an existent belief 
available and prominent in an individual’s evaluation of a problem (D. Chong & J. N. 
Druckman, 2007).   
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Even a marginally small change in the presentation of an issue can produce large changes 
in opinion (Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, 2007). For example, in a study on 
framing on welfare Rasinski (1989) finds that 20% of respondents believed that too little 
was being spent on ‘welfare’ while 65% stated that too little was being spent on 
‘assistance to the poor’(Rasinski, 1989, pp.391). This illustrates how merely rephrasing 
the same issue significantly alters the meaning to respondents (Chong, 1996; Dennis 
Chong & James N. Druckman, 2007; Zaller & Feldman, 1992)  
 
Framing literature is replete with successful studies using experimental, survey, and case 
study methods across a range of issues. These analysis include welfare issues (E. R. 
Smith & Miller, 1979), campaign finance (Grant & Rudolph, 2003), affirmative action 
(Donald R. Kinder & Sanders, 1990), support for the Supreme Court (Nicholson & 
Howard, 2003), government spending (William G. Jacoby, 2000; Nelson & Kinder., 
1996), civil liberties (Chong, 1996; Nelson et al., 1997), and gender and morality politics 
(Doan & Kirkpatrick, 2013; M. R. Joslyn & Haider–markel, 2002). This study applies 
framing theory through the experimental methods approach. I test the effects of an 
individual’s attitudes on responsibility attribution and policy through subtle changes in 
the representation of people displaced by climate change.  
 
2.2 Responsibility Attribution 
 
In addition to affecting opinion, frames may also influence an individual’s causal 
attribution. Attribution reflects how individuals direct the locus of causation of an 
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outcome. People’s perceptions of the cause of a problem shape their judgments of 
responsibility, achievement, blame, various emotions and policy attitudes (Iyengar, 
1989b; Peffley & Williams, 1985; Weiner, 1985, 2006, Heider 1958, Sigelman and 
Knight 1985). Psychological literature is replete with studies on ‘attribution’ (Jones & 
Harris, 1967; Rholes & John, 1982; Schlenker et al., 1994; Shaver, 1985; E. R. Smith & 
Miller, 1979, Gibbert and Malone 1995, Anderson and Slusher 1986) that involve the 
formation of underlining causal beliefs (Shaver, 1985).  
 
People’s perceptions on the causes of the event draw direct connections with the 
responsibility of actors related to the issue. The actors are identified both in terms of 
responsibility for the creation of the problem, as well as action to remedy the situation 
(Rudolph, 2003; Schlenker et al., 1994). These judgments and causal beliefs shape 
individual opinions and behaviors that follow (Shaver, 1985). Scholars have tested 
attribution theory in various case studies including vote choice, job performance, and 
diverse policy attitudes (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Haider‐markel & Joslyn, 2001; 
Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Leper, 1979; Nicholson & Howard, 2003; Peffley & 
Williams, 1985; Rudolph, 2003; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Brickman et al., 1975).  
 
Prominent work by Iyengar 1990 analyzes the effect of news framing on individual’s 
causal attribution of responsibility for social problems. The findings reveal that news 
stories focusing on individual actors rather than general issues tended to draw attention to 
individual agency and attribute responsibility for societal responsibility to them. 
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Attribution framing thus affects what individuals perceive as the cause of the event and 
the locus of control and responsibility.  
 
2.3 Environmental Refugees 
 
‘Environmental Refugee’ is often used by scholars to refer to the relationship between 
human movement and environmental change (Castles, 2002; François Gemenne, 2011; 
Massey, Axinn, & Ghimire, 2010; Morrissey, 2012; Suhrke, 1994). The term 
‘environmental refugee’ was coined in 1976 by Lester Brown the founder of the 
Worldwatch Institute, but was brought into public debate only a decade later by Essam 
El-Hinnawi through his landmark report of the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) (El-Hinnawi, 1985, pp.41). In the early 1980s, estimates reported over 10 million 
existing ‘environmental refugees’ (Jacobson, 1988) with an increase to 25 million by the 
1990s (Norman. Myers, 1997; N. Myers & Kent, 1995). By the year 2050 the global 
community is expected to witness more than 200 million environmental refugees 
(Christian Aid, 2007; Cord Jakobeit & Methmann, 2007; Norman. Myers, 1997, 2005). 
  
Given the severity of the problem (IPCC, 1990, 1991, 2007, 2013), global attention is 
drawn to the problem using three main narratives (Bettini, 2013). The first narrative 
posits the environment as a key and direct cause of mobility. It applies the traditional 
Malthusian push-and-pull frameworks to describe the problem (Hugo, 1996; Warner, 
                                                      
1 El-Hinnawi through his landmark report of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in Nairobi in 1985. El-
Hinnawi defined environmental refugees as “people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, 
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that 
jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life” (El-Hinnawi 1985, pp.4). 
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2011). These descriptions have underlining development narratives which suggest 
policies for environmental protection and conservation (Adger et al., 2001, Saunders 
2000). Stemming from the environmentalism movement in the 1970s (El-Hinnawi, 1985; 
Jacobson, 1988, Westing 1992) this approach describes the vulnerability of 
environmental refugees as a problem of physical environment (climate change) and social 
concern (Baechler, 1998; E. Piguet et al., 2011; Findley, 1994; F. Gemenne, 2011; C.L. 
Gray, 2009; C.L.  Gray, 2011; Henry, Schoumaker, & Beauchemin, 2004; Cord Jakobeit 
& Methmann, 2007; C. Jakobeit & Methmann, 2012; Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009; 
Morrissey, 2012; E. Piguet, 2010; Renaud, Dun, Warner, & Bogardi, 2011; Warner, 
2011; Westra, 2009).  
 
Placing environmental disruptions within their socio-economic and political contexts, 
climate change is also depicted as a threat multiplier (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012), 
leading to conflict and violence and destabilizing nation states. Within this narrative, 
studies highlight the mass movement of environmental refugees as a threat to human and 
national security (Barnett, 2000; Byravan & Rajan, 2006; Elliott, 2010; Homer-Dixon, 
1994; N. Myers & Kent, 1995; O’Lear & Diehl, 2007; Salehyan, 2008; Scheffran, 
Brzoska, Kominek, Link, & Schilling, 2012; P. J. Smith, 2007; White, 2011). 
Emphasizing the complexity of the issue, the third broad narrative draws on global 
development inequalities (Black, 2001, Lonergan 1998), migrant livelihoods and 
survival. Studies focus on economic vulnerabilities, including loss and damage to 
income, property and life (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Findlay, 2011; Findley, 1994; Manzo, 
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2010; O’Brien, Eriksen, Nygaard, & Schjolden, 2007; Clionadh. Raleigh, 2011; Stern, 
2007, 2013). 
 
In combination, the three narratives highlight the physical environment, human 
vulnerabilities, social concerns, economic-inequalities and the destabilization of nation 
states (Morrissey, 2012). These different narratives draw on the multifaceted nature of 
environment-induced mobility (E. Piguet et al., 2011; Renaud et al., 2011), whereby the 
environment cannot be isolated from its social, political and economic ‘context’ (Black, 
2001). Environmental refugees are thus positioned on a definitional continuum where the 
distinction between environmental, economic and political refugees into water-tight 
categories is blurred (Otunnu 1992).  
 
The purpose of all three frames is the same – to bring global attention on the issue of 
environment-induced displacement (Bettini, 2013). Despite growing awareness on the 
problem, there exists strong resistance in embracing ‘environmental refugees’ within 
international legal frameworks such as the UN 1951 Refugee Convention. The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Rudd Lubbers, clearly stated in an interview that “there is 
no such thing as an ‘environmental refugee’ or an ‘economic refugee’ (BBC, 2010). 
Scholars speculate that this resistance is a manifestation of the growing global mood on 
anti-immigration and anti-climate change sentiments (Morrissey, 2012). Thus instead of 
gathering support for action, the term ‘environmental refugees’ has gained resistance by 
the fate of being born within the backdrop of xenophobia and opposition to climate 
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change (McNamara 2008), especially in the United Sates. This speculation warrants 
empirical testing.  
 
2.4 Present Study 
 
This study examines the effect of different narrative frames of people displaced by 
climate change on individual perceptions in the US. Does calling them environmental 
refugees, political refugees, economic refugees or merely refugees (control) affect 
individual’s attribution of responsibility for their wellbeing and thereby the preferences 
on policy support. I also test for individual’s predispositions on anti-immigration and 
anti-climate change to investigate if certain narratives garner more support than others, 
providing a key dimension to the on-going debate that has currently not been tested in 
literature. The study is divided into two inter-related parts. Part-1 examines the effect of 
different frames on attitudes of responsibility for the wellbeing of the refugees. Building 
on this, Part 2 explores the effect of frames and responsibility attribution (DV1) on 
individual’s policy support for the refugees.  
 
2.4.1 Moderators  
Framing literature suggests incorporating ‘moderator variables’ in the study design as 
factors that condition the effect of issue frames. These include individual predispositions 
such as values and beliefs, knowledge on the issue (J. Druckman, 2001), and cultural 
values (Chong, 1996). For the purpose of this study I incorporate three moderators.  
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First, I expect individuals with a predisposition to climate change to mediate the affect of 
the frames. This bias can be caused by varying perceptions by way of awareness, 
understanding or beliefs of climate change (Böhm, 2003; Bord & O’Connor, 2000; 
Dunlap, 1998; A.  Leiserowitz, 2005; Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Truelove & Parks, 2012; 
Yeager, Larson, Krosnick, & Tompson, 2011; Zomeren Martijn, Spears Russell, & Colin, 
2010). I anticipate people opposing climate change to attribute the locus of causation of 
the problem away from themselves than those in favor of climate change (Bauer, Allum, 
& Miller, 2007; Bostrom et al., 2012; Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2008; T. W. 
Reynolds, A. Bostrom, D. Read, & M. G. Morgan, 2010; Rosentrater et al., 2013; 
Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2007; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2006; Wolf & Moser, 2011). 
This would further affect attitudes on climate change policy with the denial for climate 
change corresponding with reduced support for action (Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; 
Heath & Gifford, 2006; Anthony Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & 
Whitmarsh, 2007; O’Connor, Bord, Yarnal, & Wiefek, 2002; Read, Bostrom, Morgan, 
Fischhoff, & Smuts, 1994; Travis William Reynolds, Ann Bostrom, Daniel Read, & M. 
Granger Morgan, 2010; Rosentrater et al., 2013; Sterman & Sweeney, 2007, Tobler et al., 
2012). 
 
The Second moderator is anti-immigration prejudice. Realistic and symbolic threat of 
immigrants (D. R. Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979; Zárate, Garcia, 
Garza, & Hitlan, 2004; Zárate & Quezada, 2011) often translate into notions of 
competition for scarce resources affecting policy attitudes such as welfare support (Esses, 
Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 
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2005). I expect anti-immigration prejudice to bias the affect of frames by increasing the 
potential threat of refugees and reducing policy support for them (Stephan et al., 2005). I 
suppose this moderator will especially affect differing policy support between the US and 
the international community, with the threat being more pronounced in the U.S. scenario 
(Laczko, F., & Aghazarm, C.,2009, Pehrson & Green, 2010; Short & Magaña, 2002; 
Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2005; Zárate et al., 2004). 
 
Exposure to environmental disaster is the third moderator. Previous studies on public 
opinion for climate change have shown that risk proximity or exposure to disaster 
increases the support for climate change policies (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012; 
Joireman, Barnes Truelove, & Duell, 2010). Exposure to environmental disasters can 
indirectly capture notions of empathy. Literature on social psychology and marketing 
describe empathy as an emotional response or a cognitive sympathy of other people’s 
experiences (Preston, deWaal, & Frans, 2002; Simon, 2013; Wieseke, Geigenmüller, & 
Kraus, 2012). I expect previous exposure to environmental disasters to conjure feelings of 
empathic concern for the welfare of others experiencing similar or related environmental 
events (Batson et al., 1995; Blader & Rothman, 2014; Davis, 1994; Duan & Hill, 1996; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). This moderator may have an effect in the Environmental 
Refugees group. 
 
2.4.2 Hypothesis  
 
The study hypothesizes that receiving different frames for refugees (environmental, 
economic, political) brings forth different underlying perceptions and biases, causing 
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respondents to allocate varying levels of responsibility for the well-being of refugees, and 
thereby affect their policy attitudes. More specifically I hypothesize: 
 
H1a. Those in the Environmental Refugee condition are more likely than those in the 
control (Refugee) condition to hold the individual refugees responsible for their situation, 
and support refugee welfare policies relatively less.  
 
H1b. Similarly, the Political Refugee group respondents are more likely than those in the 
control (Refugee) condition to hold the individual refugees responsible for their situation, 
and support refugee welfare policies relatively less.  
 
H1c. In nuance, people in the Economic Refugee condition are more likely than those in 
the control (Refugee) condition to hold the individual refugees responsible for their 
situation, and support refugee welfare policies relatively less.  
 
Framing theory guides the above hypothesis where we speculate that individuals will be 
affected by their predispositions that are brought into salience by the (D. Chong & J. N. 
Druckman, 2007; J. Druckman, 2001). These predispositions are elaborated in the 
following hypothesis.  
 
H2. People with anti-climate change perceptions put the locus of responsibility relatively 
more with the individual refugees themselves and their policy attitudes garner less 
support for refugees.  
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I expect this relationship to be most pronounced for the Environmental Refugee group 
since the frame emphasizes the role of environmental and climate disasters.  
 
H3. Anti-immigration sentiment respondents will attribute more responsibility with 
individual refugees, and have less support for refugee welfare policies.  
 
Perceiving refugees as a threat to resources, people with anti-immigration biases tend to 
see the refugees as an ‘out group’ (Jang, 2013; Miller & Ross, 1975) directing the locus 
on responsibility away from themselves. Political and Economic Refugee frames are 
expected to witness this affect more distinctly, given the on-going xenophobic debate and 
threat of resources underlining these frames.  
  
H4. People with previous experience with disasters attribute less responsibility to the 
individual refugees and are more in favor of policies for refugee welfare.  
 
Climate risk or exposure to disasters conjure possible emotions of empathy drawing forth 
more support for refugees. This hypothesis maybe more evident in the case of 
Environmental Refugees where the frame reiterates environmental conditions of the 
problem.  
 
H5. Individuals who attribute more responsibility to the refugees and less to the 
international community will attribute less policy support to the US government and 
more policy initiative on the part of international community.  
15 
 
 
This hypothesis links the two parts of the study where we expect attitude on 
responsibility to bias the policy action in support of the refugees.  
 
H6. Political ideology affects individual attitudes where more liberal respondents favor 
more government involvement and welfare policies (Converse, 1964; Converse, 2000; 
Feldman, 1988, 2003; Jacoby, 2002; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Poole & Rosenthal, 
1997; Schwartz, 1992). 
16 
 
3. METHOD 
 
3.1. Participants 
 
The participants for this online experiment were 230 American adults recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in May 2013. MTurk as an online internet sample 
maintains a demographically representative pool of participants in comparison to college 
students often used in experimental research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010, Eriksson & Simpson 2010). Demographic survey 
studies have tested MTurk to show that the populations are relatively representative of 
U.S. internet users (Ipeirotis, 2009; Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 
2010). Studies have also supported the validity of internet based experimental studies as 
reliable methods for undertaking research to test individual level perceptions and 
attitudes (Berrens, Bohara, JenkinsSmith, Silva, & Weimer, 2003; Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava, & John, 2004; Krantz & Dalal, 2000). 
 
Participants of this study were between the ages 18 to 72, with a mean age of 34.37 years 
(SD 12.39). Of the 230 participants, 42.17% were female (U.S. Census 50.8%), with 
political ideology of 64% liberal, 21% conservative and 15% moderate (independents). 
Ethnic variation in the sample was 84% Caucasians (U.S. Census 78%). The respondents 
had a mean education years of 15.16 years (SD 2.77). As a whole the study sample is 
more liberal, better educated and predominantly Caucasian, making the sample a 
conservative test of the hypothesis of this study.  At the beginning, participants read the 
purpose of the online study and provide informed consent by proceeding to begin the 
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survey. The respondents self select into the study and were compensated $1 on its 
completion.  
 
3.2 Experimental frames and stimuli 
 
Experimental manipulation has been designed to evaluate the impacts of issue framing on 
individual and perceived opinions. Experimental designs are most useful in 
understanding causal relationships between variables (Cambridge Handbook of 
Experimental Political Science, 2011; J. N. Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2006; 
J. N. Druckman, Hennessy, St. Charles, & Webber, 2010; Lupia, 2002; McDermott, 
2002). The experiment is designed to use message content as a heuristic device allowing 
participants to infer information from choices provided in the survey instrument. This 
method falls within the classic stimulus-response models of social psychology (M. Joslyn 
& Haider-markel, 2006, Hovland et al., 1953). 
 
Selecting framing scenarios from real world settings (Claes, 2012) I expose participants 
to multiple repetitive frames mimicking the three narratives on-going on the issue of 
environment-induced displacement. The participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the four conditions: Environmental Refugees (n=63), Political Refugees (n=67), 
Economic Refugees (n=68), and a control group of Refugees (n=59). All four groups 
were presented an identical vignette with manipulation only in the type of ‘Refugee’ in 
the situation. Each manipulation aims to highlight only one aspect of the multi-faceted 
problem.  
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“Climate change has resulted in the increasing incidence of environmental disasters such 
as droughts and floods all around the world. These environmental disasters can cause 
significant disruption to people’s lives. They threaten people’s homes and livelihoods, 
create conflict and violence between communities, and pose a threat to human security. 
Often, the consequences of these environmental disasters result in people becoming 
REFUGEES [ENVIRONMENTAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC]. That is, they cross 
national borders into other countries in search of a place where they can work and live in 
safety and security.” 
 
The vignette is followed by the survey instrument containing four sections completed by 
all four groups. The sections, in order, include policy attitudes, perceptions on 
immigration, climate change perceptions, and demographics (gender, age, education, 
political ideology, and ethnicity). The experimental frame is repeated in questions 
throughout the survey to keep the frame manipulation active.  
 
3.3 Measures 
 
3.3.1. Conceptions of Responsibility for Plight of Refugees 
 
The first dependent variable, responsibility attribution, was captured through the question 
“Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which the responsibility for the well-
being of these REFUGEES lies with each of the following – individual refugees, friends 
and relatives of refugees, national governments, neighboring country, and international 
community”. Each of the 5 items used a 7-point scale (1_strongly disagree, 4_neither 
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agree nor disagree, 7_strongly agree). The principal components analysis revealed two 
factors where the first factor consisted of 2 items (α = 0.601) that referred to 
responsibility attribution to the individual refugee and their families, and the second 
consisted of 3 items (α = 0.763) that referred to responsibility with national, neighboring 
and international governments. These two index items are understood as responsibility 
attribution at the individual and the government level. The variable Responsibility 
Attribution was created by subtracting perceived responsibility for national, neighboring 
and international community from responsibility attribution to the individual refugees and 
their friends and family. The variable range is -5 to 6 (M = 0.16, SD = 1.61).  
 
3.3.2. Policy Support for Refugees  
 
The second dependent variable is captured through attitudes for four different types of 
policy support provided to ‘Refugees’, mainly asylum status, safe housing, jobs, and 
development aid. This policy support was asked in relation to three different actors – the 
American government, Neighboring countries, and the International community. 
Participants were asked the question “Please use the scale below to indicate your 
agreement with the questions that follow: The American government should intervene to 
offer asylum (legal rights to live and work) for these REFUGEES”, repeated for each of 
the 4 policies and 3 actor. This constituted 12 items using a 7-point scale (1_strongly 
disagree, 4_neither agree nor disagree, 7_strongly agree). The policy attitudes were 
collapsed into an index for each actor - American govt. (α = 0.928), neighboring 
countries (α = 0.934) and international community (α = 0.927). Finally, a variable for US 
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policy attitude was created by subtracting neighboring and international actors from the 
American government. This variable ranges from -3.5 to 4.1 (M = 0.57, SD = 1.09)  
 
3.3.3. Perceptions of Immigration 
 
Realistic and symbolic threat of ‘Refugees’ is a key moderator in the study (Kinder & 
Sears 1981, Zarate et al., 2004). Participants are asked 10 items through the question 
“Many REFUGEES displaced by environmental disasters seek asylum status (legal rights 
to live and work) in the United States. Please use the scale below to indicate your 
agreement with the questions that follow”. Through a 7-point scale (1_strongly disagree, 
4_neither agree nor disagree, 7_strongly agree) respondents indicate their opinion on 
Refugees conforming to American rules, ways of life, culture; having equal access to 
public schools, health care and social services; being a burden on tax and government 
services; reducing jobs opportunities and not contributing sufficiently to the American 
economy (PEW 2006). Principal components analysis revealed two factors with 5 items 
each (α = 0.840 and α = 0.823). The variables are referred to as Anti-Immigration 1 and 
Anti-Immigration 2. They range from 1 to 7 (M = 3.42, SD =1.16) and 0 to 6 (M = 3.41, 
SD = 1.17) respectively. 
 
3.3.4. Climate Change Perceptions 
 
Participants view on climate change constitutes the second moderator. Opinions of 
respondents are captured through five questions asked on a 7-point scale (1_strongly 
disagree, 4_neither agree nor disagree, 7_strongly agree). “The temperature rise 
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associated with climate change is not dangerous for the environment; The United States 
will not be affected by climate change; Modern Science will solve our environmental 
problems with little change to our way of life; Climate change is a myth created by some 
scientists; and Climate change will only impact people in poor developing countries”. A 
variable for anti-climate change perceptions was created (Cronbach α of 0.857), ranging 
from 1 to 6.6 (M = 2.6, SD = 1.23).  
 
3.3.5. Direct Exposure to Environmental Disasters 
 
Direct personal experience or that of close friends and family with natural disasters is 
expected to have a moderating effect. Respondents are asked to indicate their agreement 
on a 7-point scale (1_strongly disagree, 4_neither agree nor disagree, 7_strongly agree) 
to two questions “Environmental disasters have had a direct impact on my life; 
Environmental disasters have had a direct impact on the lives of my friends or family”. 
Disaster Experience Variable is created by combining the two items (α = 0.900), ranging 
from 1 to 7 with the mean at 3.6 (SD = 1.66).  
 
3.3.6. Control Variables 
Other variables incorporated in the models include gender, age, education and political 
ideology (Brulle et al., 2012; Hamilton, 2011; Anthony Leiserowitz, 2006; Milfont, 2012; 
Milfont, Harré, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2012; Milfont & Sibley, 2012; Tobler, Visschers, & 
Siegrist, 2012 and more). Due to lack of variation in the sample, ethnicity was dropped 
from the model.  
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3.4. Contrast Test Design 
 
The four-group design (environmental, political, economic, and control) afforded three 
focused contrasts with which to test the primary hypothesis (H1) of whether each 
experimental frame differs from the control group. The Contrast designs seek to test if the 
label on type of refugee results in differing individual support for the group. The first 
contrast tests the hypothesis (H1a) that environmental refugees receive lesser support 
from the control condition, assuming individual perceptions on both anti-climate change 
and anti-immigration beliefs are made salient. To accomplish this contrast, I weighted the 
conditions with codes of (-1, 1, 0, 0) respectively.  
 
The second contrast examines the hypothesis (H1b) of political refugees receiving 
relatively different support from the control condition. I expect values on threat to human 
security to be brought forward in this frame and weight the condition with codes of -1, 0, 
1, 0 respectively. Similarly, the third contrast tests the effect of an economic label from 
the control condition (H1c). I expect anti-immigration sentiments are made salient in this 
frame, making individual preferences differ between the treatment and control. Weighted 
contrast codes of -1, 0, 0, 1 respectively are assigned in this contrast. In addition to the 
planned contrast tests, I also report results on one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs), 
post hoc comparisons and regression analysis with interaction models for each outcome.  
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4. RESULTS  
 
4.1 Study 1: Attribution of Responsibility for Wellbeing of Refugees 
 
4.1.1 ANOVA analysis 
 
Responsibility Attribution is a composite variable calculated from two indexes - 
responsibility lies with ‘individual refugees and their families’ (M=5.04, SD=1.15) or 
with ‘national, neighboring and international governments’ (M=4.77, SD=1.16). The 
omnibus ANOVA tests reveal that the individual and family index is not significant 
F(240) = 0.446, (mean square np2 = 0.595), p=0.720, but is significant for the national, 
neighboring and international variable F(240)=5.83, (mean square np2 = 7.452), p 
=0.001. All three contrasts are significant in the national, neighboring and international 
variable (p = 0.000, 0.012, 0.001 respectively) showing that the effect of the three frames 
significantly differ from the control group (H1).  
 
The descriptive means show a pattern that participants attribute the wellbeing of the 
refugees more with the individual refugees themselves and less with international 
community across all three frames in comparison to the control group. This is tested 
further, and the 2-sided Dunnett test reveals that the participants in the three treatments 
attributed significantly lesser support than the control group in the national, neighboring 
and international variable (mean difference MD= -0.870*,MD= -0.547*, MD = -0.729* 
respectively). Thus adding a frame tends to direct the locus of responsibility more with 
the individual refugees, and reduces the liability of the international community for the 
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plight of the refugees. This effect is most pronounced in the Environmental Refugees 
group.  
 
4.1.2 OLS Regression Analysis 
 
The model analyses reveal significant variations between experimental frames. The 
treatment effect in the Environmental and Economic group is significantly different from 
the control (H1a & H1c). People receiving the Environmental Refugee manipulation tend 
to hold the individual refugees the most responsible for their situation (See Table 1, 
Model 1 Coefficients). Respondents with anti-climate change attitudes, as hypothesized 
(H2), direct the locus of responsibility to the refugees and this effect is significant in the 
Environmental frame where climate change and environmental factors are accentuated.  
 
The second moderator, Anti-Immigration bias influences the Political Refugee group 
making respondents with this sentiment increase their attribution of responsibility to the 
individual refugees (H3). Although I expected this affect in the Economic group as well, 
the results are not significant. Direct experience with environmental disasters is 
consistent with previous studies (Brulle et al., 2012; Joireman et al., 2010). Experience 
with disasters may indirectly evoke empathy for the refugees, moving the responsibility 
away from them and more towards the international community (H4). As expected, this 
influence is mainly visible in the Environmental Refugee group. 
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Table 1: Determinants of Responsibility Attribution with Refugees (Composite Variable) α 
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 
 Environmental 
Refugees 
Political Refugees Economic Refugees 
 Moderator 
Effects   
Main 
Effects 
Moderator 
Effects   
Main 
Effects 
Moderator 
Effects   
Main 
Effects 
Treatment affect 0.850** 0.806** 0.496 0.412 0.697* 0.663* 
 (0.301) (0.305) (0.270) (0.274) (0.266) (0.275) 
Anti-Climate Change 0.328* 0.255 0.098 0.031 0.197 0.169 
 (0.145) (0.156) (0.137) (0.153) (0.131) (0.144) 
Anti-Immigration 1 0.134 0.064 0.382* 0.319 0.271 0.251 
 (0.175) (0.182) (0.154) (0.170) (0.166) (0.181) 
Anti-Immigration II 0.050 -0.014 0.172 0.157 0.049 0.41 
 (0.203) (0.204) (0.182) (0.185) (0.170) (0.177) 
Disaster Experience -0.293** -0.269** 0.009 0.006 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.089) 
Conservative Ideology  0.885  0.971*  0.459 
  (0.495)  (0.449)  (0.482) 
Liberal Ideology   -0.164  0.263  0.130 
  (0.453)  (0.387)  (0.408) 
Female  -0.031  0.062  0.039 
  (0.313)  (0.287)  (0.285) 
Age  -0.006  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Education  0.002  -0.038  -0.002 
  (0.058)  (0.054)  (0.065) 
Number of Cases 103 103 105 105 107 107 
R-square 0.216 0.225 0.222 0.266 0.155 0.164 
Log-likelihood -185.277 -182.000 -177.508 -174.476 -181.068 -180.494 
Notes: Coefficients are Ordinary Least Square (OLS) coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two 
tailed significance test = **Sig. <.05; *Sig. < .10.  
α Responsibility Attribution is calculated by (Individual Refugee Index – International Community Index).  
Three separate models are run comparing each frame with the control to avoid variable co-linearity. Main 
effects models run with treatment and moderators variables. The N and R-square are for the Main Effects 
model. Control variables in model are age, gender, education and political ideology. 
 
The interaction effect in Figure 1 clearly shows that participants with low experience 
with disasters in the Environmental Refugee frame tend to attribute significantly more 
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responsibility to the refugees themselves. As the participants or their family and friends 
are exposed to environmental disasters, they tend to empathize more with the displaced 
persons and are less inclined to hold the refugees responsible. With increasing levels of 
disaster experience, the effect of frames is diluted (along the scale of 3), and there is no 
significant difference between the frame and the control group.  
 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Responsibility Attribution by Disaster Experience (Composite Variable) 
 
Individual preferences are also influences by their political ideology (interaction model) 
where the liberals move the locus of responsibility towards the international community 
and away from individual refugees in the Environmental group. This is consistent with 
literature where within American politics liberal ideals correspond with more government 
and public programs, while conservative ideologies favor limited government 
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interference and welfare programs (P.E. Converse, 1964; P. E. Converse, 2000; Feldman, 
1988, 2003; William G.  Jacoby, 2002; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Poole & 
Rosenthal, 1997; Schwartz, 1992). 
 
4.2 Study 2: Support for Policy Action for Refugee Wellbeing  
 
4.2.1 ANOVA analysis 
 
Policy Support for Refugees is a composite variable calculated by deducting 
‘International Policy Support’ (M=4.75, SD=1.19) from ‘US Policy Support’ (M=4.18, 
SD=1.41). Results from the omnibus ANOVA for these two items was not significant 
[F(245) = 2.087, np2 = 1.407, df=3, p = .621, and F(245) = 0.592, , np2 = 2.007, df=3, 
p=.103 respectively]. However, deeper investigation through the contrast test show that 
the Environmental Refugee group and control are significantly different (p = 0.013) in the 
International Policy Support Index. This points towards a manipulation affect between 
the environmental and control group (H1a).  
 
In general, preference for the US government to take policy action (in the form of 
providing asylum status, jobs, safe housing, and development aid to the refugees) is 
relatively lower than the policy action required by the International Community. This 
effect is significant in the group receiving the Environmental Refugee treatment (Dunnett 
2-sided test p = 0.04) for the International Policy Support Index (H1a). Thus calling 
refugees Environmental Refugees significantly reduces International policy support while 
maintaining US policy support at relatively low levels. 
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4.2.2 OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Similar results are observed in the model regressions where adding the Environmental or 
Economic frame significantly reduces policy support (H1a & H1c), with the largest 
coefficient being for the Environmental group. In line with our hypothesis, people 
denying climate change tend to direct the US government to take less and international 
community more policy action for the refugees (H2). Although I expected this effect to 
be more visible with the environmental narratives, the results show the effect is more 
evident in the Economic Refugees frame.  
 
Individuals with anti-immigration perspectives tend to hold the US government more 
accountable for policy action. This result may seem counter-intuitive to our expectation 
(H3), but a deeper investigation reveals that the positive effect in the composite variable 
is primarily due to a sharp decrease in policy action by international community while 
maintaining US support at a low. Thus people with anti-immigration bias support low 
action on the part of the US government, but even lower support by the international 
community. This effect is visible for the Environmental and Political groups. 
Respondents with a liberal ideology (interaction model) tend to support policy action by 
the US across all three frames, supporting theory discussed above (Jacoby 2002, 
Schwartz 1992, Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, Poole & Rosenthal 1997). 
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Table 2: Determinants of Policy Support by U.S. Government (Composite Variable) for Refugees α 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
 Environmental Refugees Political Refugees Economic Refugees 
 Moderator 
Effects   
Main 
Effects 
Moderator 
Effects   
Main 
Effects 
Moderator 
Effects   
Main 
Effects 
Treatment -0.527* -0.481* -0.367 -0.338 -0.504* -0.490* 
 (0.231) (0.239) (0.215) (0.219) (0.197) (0.200) 
Anti-Climate Change -0.007 -0.032 0.029 -0.052 -0.210* -0.252* 
 (0.110) (0.120) (0.108) (0.121) (0.095) (0.103) 
Anti-Immigration 1 0.333* 0.290* 0.304* 0.269 0.214 0.166 
 (0.130) (0.137) (0.124) (0.136) (0.120) (0.129) 
Anti-Immigration II -0.051 -0.080 0.165 0.186 0.089 0.087 
 (0.150) (0.154) (0.143) (0.146) (0.122) (0.125) 
Disaster Experience 0.066 0.076 -0.099 -0.082 -0.050 -0.056 
 (0.076) (0.078) (0.067) (0.068) (0.062) (0.063) 
Responsibility Attribution  -0.008 -0.028 -0.207* -0.232** -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.071) (0.072) 
Conservative Ideology  0.185  0.527  -0.031 
  (0.379)  (0.363)  (0.342) 
Liberal Ideology  -0.250  -0.095  -0.389 
  (0.342)  (0.306)  (0.288) 
Female  -0.018  -0.183  -0.132 
  (0.236)  (0.226)  (0.201) 
Age  0.005  -0.004  0.002 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Education  0.009  0.029  0.028 
  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.046) 
Number of Cases 103 103 105 105 107 107 
R-square 0.122 0.142 0.234 0.269 0.182 0.213 
Log-Likelihood -153.465 -152.300 -151.485 -149.053 -144.816 -142.723 
Notes: Coefficients are Ordinary Least Square (OLS) coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Two 
tailed significance test = **Sig. <.05; *Sig. < .10.  
α Policy Attitudes is calculated by (Policy Action by US – Policy Action by International Community).  
Three separate models are run comparing each frame with the control to avoid variable co-linearity. Main 
effects models run with treatment and moderators variables.  
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An interesting finding is that the responsibility attribution variable reduces policy action 
by US. In Study 1 I had seen that the general trend of frames attribute the locus of 
responsibility away from governments and towards the individual refugees themselves. 
This attitude further effects a respondent’s perception on policy action, where the US 
government is intended to take less action for the refugees (H5). This indirect effect is 
most evident among people receiving the Political Refugees frame. 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Policy Action by the US Government (Composite Variable) 
By plotting the interaction of disaster exposure we see that at low or no level of disaster 
experience, participants are more susceptible to the attitude of low policy expectation 
from the US government. As disaster experience increases, there is greater expectation 
for the US government to intervene to provide policy support.   
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
Scholars communicating information on people displaced by climate change use three 
broad narratives that highlight the multi-faceted nature of the issue (Bettini, 2013; E. 
Piguet et al., 2011; Etienne Piguet, 2013; Renaud et al., 2011) mainly environmental, 
political, economic frames. I test these frames on individual attitudes to identify if certain 
frames garner more support than others. My results indicate a clear effect of framing, 
where different frames tap into different predispositions of individuals and lead to 
varying attributions of responsibility and policy support.  
 
The first part of my study examines the effect of frames on attribution of responsibility 
for the wellbeing of refugees. I find that adding any of the three frames leads to shifting 
of the locus of responsibility from the international community to the individual refugees. 
This relocation of responsibility away from themselves and towards the ‘out-group’ 
(Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010; Jang, 2013) is indicative of how the framing of the 
problem changes perceptions of responsibility of actors involved.  
 
The Political Refugee frame is most susceptible to the moderation effect of anti-
immigration sentiments where respondents with this bias hold individual refugees more 
responsible for their situation (Esses et al. 2001, Stephan et al 2005, Staerkle et al., 2005, 
Zarate et al 2004, Pehrson & Green 2010, Short & Magana 2002). However, the frame 
for Environmental Refugees attributes the highest responsibility with the individual 
refugees themselves, and this attribution is biased by anti-climate change sentiments. 
People with more denial for climate change direct more responsibility towards the people 
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displaced (Bostrom et al., 2012, Sundblad Eva-Lotta, Biel Anders and Garlin Tommy 2007, 
Rosentrater et al., 2013, Wolf & Moser 2011, Bauer et al., 2007, Reynolds et al., 2010, 
Kellstedt er al., 2008, Viscusi & Zeckhauser 2006). Among them however, those holding 
liberal ideologies (Converse 1964, Feldman 1988, 2003, Jacoby 2002, Schwartz 1992, 
Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, Poole & Rosenthal 1997) or who have had direct or 
indirect experiences with environmental disasters expect the international community to 
step forward for the wellbeing of people displaced (Brulle et al., 2012, Joireman et al., 
2010).  
 
There is a marked difference between policy action anticipated for the US government 
and the International community. The expectations for support in providing asylum 
status, jobs, safe housing and development aid is consistently lower for the US 
government. Respondents across all frames have the opinion that the US should do 
relatively less for the refugees. This maybe a reflection of attribution of responsibility 
towards refugees whereby directing the locus of causation of the problem towards the 
‘out group’ (here the refugees), leads to opinions of less policy action expectation from 
the US government. The Political Refugee group in particular reflects this causal account. 
Thus opinions on responsibility attribution correlate to some degree with policy attitudes 
of individuals.  
 
Interestingly however, calling people Environmental Refugees receives the least support 
among the frames, including significantly lesser support from the international 
community. These results are counter-intuitive to the purpose of generating alarm and 
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sympathy for people displaced by climate change and environmental disasters. What is 
more concerning is finding this evidence with a subtle framing manipulation within a 
respondent pool of more liberal, Caucasian and better educated individuals.  It must be 
reiterated that the research design involved respondents across all four groups receiving 
the identical vignette with only a replacement in the name of the refugee. A delicate 
treatment, yet we see clear indications of different frames tapping into specific individual 
predispositions.  
 
These results corroborate speculations by Morrissey 2012 on the on-going debates within 
the environment-migration literature. Despite visible impacts of climate change in 
various regions around the world (IPCC 1990, 2007, 2013), the resistance to 
incorporating Environmental Refugees within international legal frameworks maybe 
connected with the baggage the frames carry. The backdrop of xenophobia and anti-
climate change sentiments do, to some degree, influence individual level attitudes in the 
US.  
 
5.1 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
Despite these findings, it is significant to acknowledge certain limitations that can be 
addressed in future works. First, as mentioned above, the study is representative of a 
more liberal, better educated and Caucasian sample. The limited focus on White 
American respondents does not draw on potential variations on ethnicity that can be 
elaborated on, especially since the study involves anti-immigration variables.  
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Second, the study tries to draw causal inferences (Lupia 2002, McDermott 2002, 
Druckman et al. 2006, Druckman et al. 2011) in the analysis of the effects of different 
frames. Cognizant of the limitations of an experimental design, the findings of the 
research are suggestive of perceptions at the individual level, and limited in its 
generalizability as a public opinion survey. Third, the study captures attitudinal measures 
of the respondents such as perceived responsibility and policy attitudes. There is scope to 
expand on this by capturing actual behavioral measures over time to get a better 
understanding of implications of the study (Jang 2013).  
 
Fourth, the sample of respondents is only within the US. It would be interesting to test 
these hypotheses across other countries, both developed and developing nations, to see if 
the findings hold. This would also allow more validation on the moderator variables of 
anti-climate change and anti-immigration attitudes. 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Three broad narratives in literature currently emphasize the plight of people displaced by 
climate change and environmental disasters. While scholars have identified and critiqued 
these narratives, this study tests the effect of different narratives on individual 
perceptions in America. I apply an experimental manipulation of three frames mimicking 
these narratives mainly Environmental Refugees, Political Refugees, Economic Refugees 
and a Control (Refugees). I specifically test for causal connections of three moderators 
that are speculated to bias the effect of different frames – anti-climate change, anti-
immigration and exposure to environmental disasters. My findings reveal that 
participants attribute higher responsibility to individual refugees in all three frames, with 
the Environmental Refugees receiving the least support from international community. 
These preferences are affected by individual predispositions of anti-climate change 
perceptions, anti-immigration sentiments, political ideology, and exposure to disasters.  
 
The findings are similar for policy attitudes providing asylum status, safe housing, jobs, 
and development aid for the refugees. Participants in general expect the US government 
to take relatively lesser action than the international community for the wellbeing of the 
refugees. Again, the least support is garnered by the Environmental Refugees frame. The 
results are counter-intuitive to the purpose of scholars using these frames, especially the 
environmental narrative, as a means to generate awareness and alarm for policy action for 
people displaced. Although the findings are only suggestive of the underlying individual 
attitudes, it does indicate the effect different frames have on how responsibility is 
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attributed and the effect individual predispositions may have on policy attitudes. These 
findings contribute to the larger discourse on environment-migration nexus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
7. REFERENCES 
 
Adger, W. N., A.B. Tor, B. Katrina, & Hanne, S. (2001). Advancing a political ecology 
of global environmental discourses. Development and Change, 32(4), 681–715.  
 
B. Docherty, & Giannini, T. (2009). Confronting a rising tide: a proposal for a 
convention on climate change refugees. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 
33(2), 349–403.  
 
Baechler, G. (1998). Why environmental transformation causes violence. A synthesis 
Environmental Change and Security Project Report (Vol. 4, pp. 24–44). 
 
Bakewell, O. (2008). ‘Keeping Them in Their Place’: the ambivalent relationship 
between development and migration in Africa. Third World Quarterly, 29(7), 
1341–1358.  
 
Balcetis, E., & Dunning, D. (2006). See what you want to see: Motivational influences on 
visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(4), 612-625.  
 
Bardsley, D. K., & Hugo, G. J. (2010). Migration and climate change: examining 
thresholds of change to guide effective adaptation decision-making. Popul 
Environ, 32(2), 238–262.  
 
Barnett, J. (2000). Destabilizing the environment-conflict thesis. Review of International 
Studies, 26(2), 271–288.  
 
Bates, D. C. (2002). Environmental refugees? Classifying human migrations caused by 
environmental change. Popul Environ, 23(5), 465–477.  
 
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Todd, R. M., Brummett, B. H., Shaw, L. L., & Aldeguer, C. 
M. R. (1995). Empathy and the collective good: Caring for one of the others in a 
social dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 619–631.  
 
Bauer, M. W., Allum, N., & Miller, S. (2007). What can we learn from 25 years of PUS 
survey research? Liberating and expanding the agenda. Public Understanding of 
Science, 16, 79-95. doi: 10.1177/0963662506071287 
 
BBC. (2010). Refugees and Migrants: Defining the Difference.  
 
Berrens, R. P., Bohara, A. K., JenkinsSmith, H., Silva, C., & Weimer, D. L. (2003). The 
Advent of Internet Surveys for Political Research: A Comparison of Telephone 
and Internet Samples. Political Analysis, 11(1), 1-22.  
 
Bettini, G. (2013). Climate Barbarians at the Gate? A critique of apocalyptic narratives 
on 'climate refugees'. Geoforum, 45, 63.  
38 
 
 
Betts, A. (2013). Survival Migration - Failed Governance and the Crisis of 
Displacement. London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Biermann, F., & Boas, I. (2007). Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global 
Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees Global Governance Working 
Paper. 
  
Black, R. (2001). Environmental refugees: Myth or reality? New Issues in Refugee 
Research (Vol. Working Paper No.34): UNHCR. 
 
Black, R., Adger, W. N., Arnell, N. W., Dercon, S., Geddes, A., & Thomas, D. (2011). 
The effect of environmental change on human migration. Global Environmental 
Change, 21, S3-S11. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.10.001 
 
Blader, S. L., & Rothman, N. B. (2014). Paving the road to preferential treatment with 
good intentions: Empathy, accountability and fairness. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 50, 65–81.  
 
Böhm, G. (2003). Emotional reactions to environmental risks: Consequentialist versus 
ethical evaluation. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 23, 199-212.  
Bord, R. J., & O’Connor, R. E., & Fisher, A. . (2000). In what sense does the public need 
to understand global climate change? Public Understanding of Science, 9, 205-
218.  
 
Bostrom, A., O’Connor, R. E., Böhm, G., Hanss, D., Bodi, O., Ekström, F., . . . 
Sælensminde, I. (2012). Causal thinking and support for climate change policies: 
International survey findings. Global Environmental Change, 22(1), 210-222. doi: 
10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.012 
 
Brulle, J. R., Carmichael, J., & Jenkins, J. C. (2012). Shifting public opinion on climate 
change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate 
change in the U.S., 2002-2010. Climate Change, 114, 169-188. 
 
Buhrmester, M. D., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A 
new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality data? Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 6(1), 3–5.  
 
Byravan, S., & Rajan, S. C. (2006). Providing new homes for climate change exiles. 
Climate Policy, 6(2), 247–252.  
 
C. Farbotko, & Lazrus, H. (2012). The first climate refugees? Contesting global 
narratives of climate change in Tuvalu. Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 
382–390.  
 
39 
 
Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science. (2011).  (Druckman N. James, 
Green P. Donald, Kuklinski H. James & L. Arthur Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
  
Castles, S. (2002). Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the 
debate New Issues in Refugee Research (Vol. Working Paper no. 70). . Oxford: 
Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. 
 
Chong, D. (1996). Creating Common Frames of Reference on Political Issues. In Diana 
C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman & R. A. Brody (Eds.), Political Persuasion and 
Attitude Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing Public Opinion in Competitive 
Democracies. APSR, 101(4), 637-655. doi: 10.1017/S0003055407070554 
 
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing theory Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. (Vol. 10, pp. 
103-126). 
 
Christian Aid. (2007). Human Tide. The Real Migration Crisis. London: Christian Aid. 
Claes, D. V. (2012). New Avenues for Framing Research. American Behavioral Scientist, 
56(3), 365-375.  
 
Converse, P. E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In D. Apter (Ed.), 
Ideology and Discontent (pp. 206-261). New York: Free. 
 
Converse, P. E. (2000). Assessing the capacity of mass electorates. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 
3, 331-353.  
 
Davis, M. H. (1994). Empathy: A social psychological approach. Boulder, CO: West 
view press. 
 
Dietz, T., Dan, A., & Shwom, R. (2007). Support for Climate Change Policy: Social 
Psychological and Social Structural Influences*. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 185-214. 
doi: 10.1526/003601107781170026 
 
Doan, A. E., & Kirkpatrick, K. (2013). Giving Girls a Shot: An Examination of 
Mandatory Vaccination Legislation. Policy Studies Journal, 41(2), 295-318.  
 
Druckman, J. (2001). Evaluating framing effects. Journal of Economic Psychology, 22, 
91–101.  
 
Druckman, J. N., Green, D. P., Kuklinski, J. H., & Lupia, A. (2006). The Growth and 
Development of Experimental Research in Political Science. APSR, 100(4), 627-
635. doi: 10.1017/S0003055406062514 
 
40 
 
Druckman, J. N., Hennessy, C. L., St. Charles, K., & Webber, J. (2010). Competing 
Rhetoric Over Time: Frames Versus Cues. J of Pol, 72(1), 136-148. doi: 
10.1017/S0022381609990521 
 
Duan, C., & Hill, C. (1996). The current state of empathy research. Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, 43(3), 261–274.  
 
Dunlap, R. E. (1998). Lay perceptions of global risk: Public views of global warming in 
cross-national context. International Sociology, 13, 473-498. doi: 
10.1177/026858098013004004 
 
E. Piguet, A. Pécoud, & Guchteneire, P. d. (2011). Migration and Climate Change: An 
Overview. Refugee Survey Quarterly.  
 
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related 
behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 91–119.  
 
El-Hinnawi, E. (1985). Environmental Refugees. Nairobi: United Nations Environment 
Programme. 
 
Elliott, L. (2010). Climate migration and climate migrants: what threat, whose security? 
In J. McAdam (Ed.), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives. Oxford Hart Publishing. 
 
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal 
of Communication, 43, 51-58.  
 
Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J. F., Jackson, L. M., & Armstrong, T. L. (2001). The immigration 
dilemma: The role of perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice, and national 
identity. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 389–412. doi: 10.1111/0022-4537.00220 
 
Farbotko, C. (2005). Tuvalu and Climate Change: Constructions of Environmental 
Displacement in The Sydney Morning Herald. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, 
Human Geography, 87(4), 279-293. doi: 10.1111/j.0435-3684.2005.00199.x 
 
Feldman, S. (1988). Structure and consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core 
Beliefs and Values. American Journal of Political Science, 32(May), 416-440.  
 
Feldman, S. (2003). “Values, Ideology and the Structure of Political Attitudes. In David 
O. Sears, L. Huddy & R. Jervis (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ferguson, M. A., & Branscombe, N. R. (2010). Collective guilt mediates the effect of 
beliefs about global warming on willingness to engage in mitigation behavior. 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 30(2), 135-142. doi: 
10.1016/j.jenvp.2009.11.010 
41 
 
 
Findlay, A. M. (2011). Migrant destinations in an era of environmental change. Global 
Environmental Change, 21, S50-S58. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.004 
 
Findley, S. E. (1994). Does drought increase migration? A study of migration from rural 
Mali during the 1983–1985 drought. International Migration Review, 28(3), 539–
553.  
 
Gemenne, F. (2011). Climate-induced population displacements in a 4 degrees C+ world. 
Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci, 369(1934), 182-195. doi: 
10.1098/rsta.2010.0287 
 
Gemenne, F. (2011). How they became the human face of climate change. Research and 
policy interactions in the birth of the ‘environmental migration’ concept. In E. 
Piguet, A. Pécoud & P. d. Guchteneire (Eds.), Migration and Climate Change 
(pp. 225-259). Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press/UNESCO. 
 
Gosling, S., Vazire, S., Srivastava, S., & John, O. (2004). Should We trust web-based 
studies? A comparative analysis of six preconceptions about internet 
questionnaires. American Psychologist, 59, 93–104.  
 
Grant, J., & Rudolph, T. (2003). Value conflict, group affect, and the issue of campaign 
finance. American Journal of Political Science, 47, 453–469.  
 
Gray, C. L. (2009). Environment, Land, and Rural Out-migration in the Southern 
Ecuadorian Andes. World Development, 37(2), 457–468.  
 
Gray, C. L. (2011). Soil quality and human migration in Kenya and Uganda. Global 
Environmental Change, 21(2), 421–430.  
 
Haider‐markel, D. P., & Joslyn, M. R. (2001). Gun Policy, Opinion, Tragedy, and Blame 
Attribution: The Conditional Influence of Issue Frames. Journal of Politics, 63(2), 
520-543. doi: 10.1111/0022-3816.00077 
 
Hamilton, C. L. (2011). Education, politics and opinions about climate change evidence 
for interaction effects. Climate Change, 104, 231-242.  
 
Hartmann, B. (2010). Rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: rhetoric, reality 
and the politics of policy discourse. Journal of International Development, 22(2), 
233–246.  
 
Heath, Y., & Gifford, R. (2006). Free-market ideology and environmental degradation: 
The case of belief in global climate change. Environment & Behavior, 38, 48-71. 
doi: 10.1177/0013916505277998 
 
42 
 
Hendrix, C. S., & Salehyan, I. (2012). Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict in 
Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 35-50. doi: 
10.1177/0022343311426165 
 
Henry, S., Schoumaker, B., & Beauchemin, C. (2004). The impact of rainfall on the first 
out-migration: a multi-level event-history analysis in Burkina Faso. Popul 
Environ, 25(5), 423–460.  
 
Hieder, Fritz. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
 
Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1994). Environmental scarcities and violent conflict. International 
Security, 19(1), 5–41.  
 
Hugo, G. (1996). Environmental Concerns and International Migration. International 
Migration Review of Policy Research, 30, 105–131.  
 
IPCC. (1990). Policymakers summary of the potential impacts of climate change Report 
of Working Group II (pp. 20). 
 
IPCC. (1991). First Assessment Report: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
 
Ipeirotis, P. (2009). Turker demographics vs. Internet demographics.   Retrieved Nov 11, 
2013 
 
Iyengar, S. (1989a). How citizens think about national issues: a matter of responsibility. 
American Journal of Political Science, 33(4), 878.  
 
Iyengar, S. (1989b). How Citizens Think about National Issues: A Matter of 
Responsibility. American Journal of Political Science, 33(4), 878-900.  
 
J.S. Dryzek, & Stevenson, H. (2012). Democratising the global climate regime. In C. 
Methmann, D. Rothe & B. Stephan (Eds.), (De-)constructing the Greenhouse: 
Interpretive Approaches to Global Climate Governance. London, New York 
Routledge. 
 
Jacobson, L. J. (1988). Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability Worldwatch 
Paper (Vol. 86). 
 
Jacoby, W. G. (2000). Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government 
Spending.(Statistical Data Included). American Journal of Political Science, 
44(4), 750.  
 
Jacoby, W. G. (2002). Core Values and Political Attitudes. In B. Norrander & C. Wilcox 
(Eds.), Understanding Public Opinion (2nd Edition). Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press. 
43 
 
 
Jakobeit, C., & Methmann, C. (2007). Klimaflüchtlinge: Die verleugnete Katastrophe A 
report prepared for Greenpeace. Hamburg: Greenpeace Germany. 
 
Jakobeit, C., & Methmann, C. (2012). ‘Climate Refugees’ as dawning catastrophe? A 
critique of the dominant quest for numbers. In M. B. J. Scheffran, H.G. Brauch, 
P.M. Link, J. Schilling (Ed.), Climate change, human security and violent 
conflict: challenges for societal stability. New York Springer. 
 
Jang, S. M. (2013). Framing responsibility in climate change discourse: Ethnocentric 
attribution bias, perceived causes, and policy attitudes. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 36, 27-36.  
 
Joireman, J., Barnes Truelove, H., & Duell, B. (2010). Effect of outdoor temperature, 
heat primes and anchoring on belief in global warming. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 30(4), 358-367. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvp.2010.03.004 
 
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). "The Attribution of Attitudes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 3(1), 1-24.  
 
Joslyn, M., & Haider-markel, D. (2006). Should We Really “Kill” the Messenger? 
Framing Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Role of Messengers. Political 
Communication, 23(1), 85-103. doi: 10.1080/10584600500477104 
 
Joslyn, M. R., & Haider–markel, D. P. (2002). Framing Effects on Personal Opinion and 
Perception of Public Opinion: The Cases of Physician–Assisted Suicide and 
Social Security. Social Science Quarterly, 83(3), 690-706. doi: 10.1111/1540-
6237.00109 
 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology its structure, 
functions, and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307.  
 
K. O’Brien, S. Eriksen, L.P. Nygaard, & Schjolden, A. (2007). Why different 
interpretations of vulnerability matter in climate change discourses. Climate 
Policy, 7(1), 73–88.  
 
Kellstedt, P. M., Zahran, S., & Vedlitz, A. (2008). Personal Efficacy, the Information 
Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the 
United States. Risk Analysis, 28(1), 113-126. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-
6924.2008.01010.x 
 
Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. (1990). Mimicking Political DebateWith Survey 
Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for Blacks. Social 
Cognition, 8(1), 73–103.  
 
44 
 
Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus 
racial threats to the good life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 
414–431. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.40.3.414 
 
Krantz, J. H., & Dalal, R. (2000). Validity of web-based psychological research. In M. H. 
Birnbaum (Ed.), Psychological experiments on the Internet (pp. 35–60). New 
York: Academic Press. 
 
Kunda, Z. (1990). The Case for Motivated Reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 
480-498.  
 
Laczko, F., & Aghazarm, C. (2009). Migration, Environment and Climate Change: 
Assessing the Evidence. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. 
 
Leiserowitz, A. (2005). American risk perceptions: Is climate change dangerous? . Risk 
Analysis, 25, 1433-1442. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00690.x 
 
Leiserowitz, A. (2006). Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The 
Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values. Climatic Change, 77(1-2), 45-72. doi: 
10.1007/s10584-006-9059-9 
 
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Leper, M. R. (1979). Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27(2098-2109).  
 
Lorenzoni, I., Nicholson-Cole, S., & Whitmarsh, L. (2007). Barriers perceived to 
engaging with climate change among the UK public and their policy implications. 
Global Environmental Change, 17, 445-459.  
 
Lupia, A. (2002). New Ideas in Experimental Political Science. Political Analysis, 10(4), 
319-324.  
 
Manzo, K. (2010). Imaging vulnerability: the iconography of climate change. Area, 
42(1), 96–107.  
 
Massey, D. S., Axinn, W. G., & Ghimire, D. J. (2010). Environmental Change and Out-
Migration: Evidence from Nepal. Popul Environ, 32(2), 109-136. doi: 
10.1007/s11111-010-0119-8 
 
McAdam, J. (2011). Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement 
Treaty Is Not the Answer. International Journal of Refugee Law, 23(1), 2-27.  
 
McDermott, R. (2002). Experimental Methodology in Political Science. Political 
Analysis, 10(4), 325-342.  
 
45 
 
Methmann, C. P. (2010). Climate Protection” as empty signifier: a discourse theoretical 
perspective on climate mainstreaming in world politics. Millennium, 39(2), 345–
372.  
 
Milfont, T. L. (2012). The Interplay Between Knowledge, Perceived Efficacy, and 
Concern About Global Warming and Climate Change: A One-Year Longitudinal 
Study. Risk Analysis, 32(6), 1003-1020. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01800.x 
 
Milfont, T. L., Harré, N., Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2012). The Climate-Change 
Dilemma: Examining the Association Between Parental Status and Political Party 
Support1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 42(10), 2386-2410. doi: 
10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00946.x 
 
Milfont, T. L., & Sibley, C. G. (2012). The big five personality traits and environmental 
engagement: Associations at the individual and societal level. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 32(2), 187-195. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvp.2011.12.006 
 
Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. (1975). Self-Serving Attribution Biases in the Attribution of 
Causality: Fact or Fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213-225.  
 
Morrissey, J. (2012). Rethinking the 'debate on environmental refugees': from 
'maximilists and minimalists' to 'proponents and critics'. Journal of Political 
Ecology, 19, 36-49.  
 
Myers, N. (1997). Environmental Refugees. Population Environment, 10, 167-182.  
 
Myers, N. (2005). Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue Paper for 
Session III– Environment and Migration (Vol. 13th Economic Forum). 
 
Myers, N., & Kent, J. (1995). Environmental Exodus: An emergent crisis in the global 
arena. Washington, DC: The Climate Institute. 
 
N. Detraz, & Betsill, M. M. (2009). Climate change and environmental security: for 
whom the discourse shifts. International Studies Perspectives, 10(3), 303–320.  
 
Nelson, T. E., & Kinder., D. R. (1996). Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American 
Public Opinion. Journal of Politics, 58(4), 1055–1078.  
 
Nelson, T. E., Rosalee A. Clawson, & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). Media Framing of a Civil 
Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance. American Political Science Review 
of Policy Research, 91(3), 567–583.  
 
Nicholson, S., & Howard, R. (2003). Framing support for the Supreme Court in the 
aftermath of Bush v. Gore. Journal of  Politics, 65, 676–695.  
 
46 
 
Nisbet, M. C., & Myers, T. (2007). The Polls Trends: Twenty Years of Public Opinion 
about Global Warming. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(3), 444-470. doi: 
10.1093/poq/nfm031 
 
O’Brien, K., Eriksen, S., Nygaard, L. P., & Schjolden, A. (2007). Why different 
interpretations of vulnerability matter in climate change discourses. Climate 
Policy, 7(1), 73–88.  
 
O’Connor, R. E., Bord, R. J., Yarnal, B., & Wiefek, N. (2002). Who wants to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions? Social Science Quarterly, 83, 1-17.  
 
O’Lear, S., & Diehl, P. F. (2007). Not drawn to scale: research on resource and 
environmental conflict. Geopolitics, 12(1), 166–183.  
 
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(5).  
 
Peffley, M., & Williams, J. T. (1985). Attributing Presidential Responsibility for National 
Economic Problems. American Politics Quarterly, 13(4), 393-425.  
 
Pehrson, S., & Green, E. G. T. (2010). Who we are and who can join us: National identity 
content and entry criteria for new immigrants. Journal of Social Issues, 66, 695–
716. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2010.01671.x 
 
Piguet, E. (2010). Linking climate change, environmental degradation, and migration: a 
methodological overview. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(4), 
517–524.  
 
Piguet, E. (2013). From “Primitive Migration” to “Climate Refugees”: The Curious Fate 
of the Natural Environment in Migration Studies. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 103(1), 148-162. doi: 10.1080/00045608.2012.696233 
 
Poole, K., & Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call 
Voting. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
 
Preston, S., deWaal, D., & Frans, B. M. (2002). Empathy : its ultimate and proximate 
bases. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(Februrary), 1–72.  
 
R. Reuveny, J.W. Maxwell, & Davis, J. (2011). On conflict over natural resources. 
Ecological Economics, 70(4), 698–712.  
 
Raleigh, C. (2011). The search for safety: The effects of conflict, poverty and ecological 
influences on migration in the developing world. Global Environmental Change, 
21, S82-S93. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.008 
 
47 
 
Raleigh, C., & Kniveton, D. (2012). Come rain or shine: An analysis of conflict and 
climate variability in East Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 51-64. doi: 
10.1177/0022343311427754 
 
Rasinski, K. (1989). The effect of question wording on public support for government 
spending. Public Opinion Quarterly, 3, 388–394.  
 
Read, D., Bostrom, A., Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., & Smuts, T. (1994). What do 
people know about global climate-change? Survey studies of educated lay people. 
Risk Analysis, 14, 971-982. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.1994.tb00066.x 
 
Renaud, F. G., Dun, O., Warner, K., & Bogardi, J. (2011). A Decision Framework for 
Environmentally Induced Migration. International Migration, 49, e5-e29. doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00678.x 
 
Reuveny, R. (2007). Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. Political 
Geography, 26(6), 656-673. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001 
 
Reynolds, T. W., Bostrom, A., Read, D., & Morgan, M. G. (2010). Now What Do People 
Know About Global Climate Change? Survey Studies of Educated Laypeople. 
Risk Analysis, 30(10), 1520-1538. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01448.x 
 
Reynolds, T. W., Bostrom, A., Read, D., & Morgan, M. G. (2010). Now what do people 
know about global climate change? Survey studies of educated laypeople. Risk 
Anal, 30(10), 1520-1538. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01448.x 
 
Rholes, W., & John, P. B. (1982). Cognitive Accessibility and Causal Attributions. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8(4), 719-729.  
 
Riker, W. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. 
 
Risbey, J. S. (2008). The new climate discourse: alarmist or alarming? Global 
Environmental Change – Human and Policy Dimensions, 18(1), 26–37.  
 
Rosentrater, L. D., Sælensminde, I., Ekström, F., Böhm, G., Bostrom, A., Daniel, H., & 
O'Connor, R. E. (2013). Efficacy Trade-Offs in Individuals' Support for Climate 
Change Policies. Environment and Behavior, 45, 935. doi: 
10.1177/0013916512450510 
 
Ross, J., Irani, L., Silberman, M. S., Zaldivar, A., & Tomlinson, B. (2010). Who are the 
crowdworkers?: shifting demographics in mechanical turk. Paper presented at the 
CHI EA ’10: Proceedings of the 28th of the international conference extended 
abstracts on Human factors in computing systems, New York. 
 
48 
 
Rudolph, T. J. (2003). Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and 
Consequences of Responsibility Attributions. American Journal of Political 
Science, 47(4), 698-713. doi: 10.1111/1540-5907.00049 
 
Salehyan, I. (2008). From climate change to conflict? No consensus yet. Journal of Peace 
Research, 45(3), 315–327.  
 
Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P. M., & Schilling, J. (2012). Climate 
change and violent conflict. Science, 336 (6083), 869–871.  
 
Schlenker, B. R., Thomas, W., Britt, J., Pennington, Rodolfo, M., & Kevin, D. (1994). 
The Triangle Model of Responsibility. Psychological Review, 101(4), 632-652.  
 
Schwartz, S. (1992). Universals in the content and Structure of Values. In M. P. Zanna 
(Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Volume 25). New York: 
Academic Press. 
 
Sears, D. O., Hensler, C. P., & Speer, L. K. (1979). Whites’ opposition to “busing:” Self-
interest or symbolic politics? American Political Science Review, 73, 369–384. 
doi: 10.2307/1954885 
 
Shaver, K. (1985). The Attribution of Blame: Causality, Responsibility, and 
Blameworthiness. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Short, R., & Magaña, L. (2002). Political rhetoric, immigration attitudes, and 
contemporary prejudice: A Mexican American dilemma. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 142, 701–712. doi: 10.1080/00224540209603930 
 
Simon, F. (2013). The influence of empathy in complaint handling: Evidence of 
gratitudinal and transactional routes to loyalty Journal of Retailing and Consumer 
Services, 20, 599–608.  
 
Smith, E. R., & Miller, F. D. (1979). Salience and the Cognitive Mediation of 
Attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(4), 2240–2252.  
 
Smith, P. J. (2007). Climate change, mass migration and the military response. Orbis, 
51(4), 617–633.  
 
Sniderman, P. (1993). The new look in public opinion research. In A. W. Finifter (Ed.), 
Political Science: The state of the discipline II (pp. 42–83). Washington, DC: 
American Political Science Association. 
 
Staerklé, C., Sidanius, J., Green, E. G. T., & Molina, L. (2005). Ethnic minority–majority 
asymmetry and attitudes towards immigrants across 11 nations. Psicología 
Política, 30, 7–26.  
 
49 
 
Stephan, W. G., Renfro, C. L., Esses, V. M., Stephan, C. W., & Martin, T. (2005). The 
effects of feeling threatened on attitudes toward immigrants. International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29, 1–19. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.04.011 
 
Sterman, J., & Sweeney, L. (2007). nderstanding public complacency about climate 
change: Adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter. 
Climatic Change, 80, 213-238. doi: 10.1007/s10584-006-9107-5 
 
Stern, N. (2007). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Suhrke, A. (1994). Environmental degradation and population flows. Journal of 
International Affairs, 47(2), 473-496.  
 
Sundblad, E.-L., Biel, A., & Gärling, T. (2007). Cognitive and affective risk judgements 
related to climate change. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 27(2), 97-106. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jenvp.2007.01.003 
 
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political 
Beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755-769.  
 
Tobler, C., Visschers, V. H. M., & Siegrist, M. (2012). Addressing climate change: 
Determinants of consumers' willingness to act and to support policy measures. 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 32(3), 197-207. doi: 
10.1016/j.jenvp.2012.02.001 
 
Truelove, H. B., & Parks, C. (2012). Perceptions of behaviors that cause and mitigate 
global warming and intentions to perform these behaviors. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 32(3), 246-259. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvp.2012.04.002 
 
UNFCCC. (2013). PRESS RELEASE UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw keeps 
governments on a track towards 2015 climate agreement.  
 
UNHCR. (1951). Thirteenth Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 1, .  
Retrieved 15th Aug 2012 
 
UNHCR. (2002). Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the 
Debate. In S. Castles (Ed.), Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit,New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Working Paper (Vol. 70). 
 
Viscusi, W. K., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2006). The perception and valuation of the risks of 
climate change: A rational and behavioral blend. Climatic Change, 77, 151-177. 
doi: 10.1007/s10584-006-9075-9 
 
50 
 
Warner, K. (2011). Environmental change and migration: methodological considerations 
from ground-breaking global survey. Popul Environ, 33(1), 3-27. doi: 
10.1007/s11111-011-0150-4 
 
Weiner, B. (1985). An attribution theory of achievement, motivation, and emotion. 
Psychological Review, 92, 548-573.  
 
Weiner, B. (2006). Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions: An attributional 
approach. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Westra, L. (2009). Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees. London: 
Earthscan. 
 
White, G. (2011). Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming 
World. Oxford Oxford University Press. 
 
Wieseke, J., Geigenmüller, A., & Kraus, F. (2012). On the role of empathy in customer– 
employee interactions. Journal of Service Research, 15(3), 316–331.  
 
Wolf, J., & Moser, S. C. (2011). Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement 
with climate change: insights from in-depth studies across the world. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2(4), 547-569. doi: 10.1002/wcc.120 
 
Yeager, D. S., Larson, S. B., Krosnick, J. A., & Tompson, T. (2011). Measuring 
Americans’ issue priorities. Public Opinion Quarterly, 75, 125-138. doi: 
10.1093/poq/nfq075 
 
Zaller, J., & Feldman, S. (1992). A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering 
Questions versus Revealing Preferences. American Journal of Political Science, 
36(3), 579-616.  
 
Zárate, M. A., Garcia, B., Garza, A., & Hitlan, R. (2004). Cultural threat and perceived 
realistic group conflict as dual predictors of prejudice. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 40, 99–105.  
 
Zárate, M. A., & Quezada, S. A. (2011). Future directions in research regarding attitudes 
towards immigrants. ASAP: Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 12, 160–
166. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-2415.2011.01270.x 
 
Zomeren Martijn, Spears Russell, & Colin, L. W. (2010). Experimental evidence for a 
dual pathway model analysis of coping with the climate crisis. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 30, 339-346.  
 
 
51 
 
8. APPENDICES  
 8.1 Appendix: Mean Values Responsibility for Well-being of ‘Refugees’ (DV1) 
 
 
8.2. Appendix: Mean Values Policy support for ‘Refugees’ (DV2) 
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8.3. Appendix: Distribution of Refugee Wellbeing with Individuals 
(Composite) 
 
8.4. Appendix: Distribution of Refugee Wellbeing with Individuals 
(Composite) 
 
53 
 
8.5. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Anti-Immigration1 
 
8.6. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Anti-Immigration2 
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8.7. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Anti-Climate Change 
 
8.8. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Direct Exposure with Environmental 
Disasters 
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8.9. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Political Ideology 
 
8.10. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Age 
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8.11. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Education (in years) 
 
8.12. Appendix: Frequency Distribution of Gender by Treatment Groups 
Treatment Male Female Total 
Refugee (Control) 32 21 53 
Environmental 33 24 57 
Political 30 29 59 
Economic 38 23 61 
Total 133 97 230 
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8.13. Appendix: Regression Analysis of Wellbeing of Responsibility of 
Refugees with the Individuals Themselves [Environmental vs. Refugee] 
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 
 Main Effects Interact 
Ideology 
Interact 
Disaster 
(Intercept) -0.114 -.883 -1.410 
 (1.310) (1.324) (1.324) 
Treatment 0.847** 2.174** 2.907*** 
 (0.312) (0.656) (0.735) 
Anti-Immigration 1 0.136 0.192 0.040 
 (0.184) (0.181) (0.179) 
Anti-Immigration 2 0.047 -0.017 0.151 
 (0.207) (0.205) (0.201) 
Anti-Climate Change 0.280 0.276 0.233 
 (0.160) (0.156) (0.154) 
Disaster Experience -0.288** -0.266** 0.058 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.149) 
Political Ideology -0.137 0.278 -0.127 
 (0.231) (0.289) (0.221) 
Gender (Female) -0.048 0.123 0.017 
 (0.320) (0.322) (0.307) 
Age -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Education -0.012 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) 
Treatment x Political Ideology  -0.927*  
  (0.405)  
Treatment x Disaster Experience   -0.577** 
   (0.188) 
R-square 0.260 0.300 0.328 
Log-likelihood -184.927 -182.081 -179.920 
N 103 103 103 
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8.14. Appendix: Regression Analysis of Wellbeing of Responsibility of 
Refugees with the Individuals Themselves [Political & Economic vs. Refugee] 
 Political Economic 
 Main Effects Main Effects 
(Intercept) -2.321 -2.076 
 (1.198) (1.262) 
Treatment 0.448 0.695* 
 (0.279) (0.273) 
Anti-Immigration 1 0.379* 0.275 
 (0.171) (0.180) 
Anti-Immigration 2 0.158 0.049 
 (0.188) (0.177) 
Anti-Climate Change 0.126 0.205 
 (0.149) (0.140) 
Disaster Experience -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.088) (0.089) 
Political Ideology 0.094 0.030 
 (0.196) (0.201) 
Gender (Female) 0.167 0.057 
 (0.288) (0.284) 
Age 0.004 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Education -0.032 0.003 
 (0.055) (0.065) 
R-square 0.230 0.156 
Log-likelihood -177.023 -181.025 
N 105 107 
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8.15. Appendix: Regression Analysis of Policy Support for Refugees by US 
Govt. [Environmental vs. Refugee] 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
 Main Effects Interact 
Ideology 
Interact 
Disaster 
(Intercept) -0.142 0.416 1.099 
 (0.964) (0.979) (0.954) 
Treatment -0.483* -1.471** -2.513*** 
 (0.239) (0.512) (0.570) 
Responsibility Attribution -0.010 0.028 0.078 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.075) 
Anti-Immigration 1 0.311* 0.266 0.390** 
 (0.136) (0.135) (0.128) 
Anti-Immigration 2 -0.062 -0.017 -0.165 
 (0.153) (0.151) (0.145) 
Anti-Climate Change -0.029 -0.038 -0.010 
 (0.119) (0.117) (0.111) 
Disaster Experience 0.075 0.070 -0.299* 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.107) 
Political Ideology -0.140 -0.433* -0.137 
 (0.170) (0.214) (0.158) 
Gender (Female) -0.023 -0.143 -0.080 
 (0.236) (0.238) (0.220) 
Age 0.006 0.008 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Education 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) 
Treatment x Political Ideology  0.667*  
  (0.308)  
Treatment x Disaster Experience   0.548*** 
   (0.141) 
R-square 0.133 0.176 0.256 
Log-likelihood -152.817 -150.220 -144.966 
N 103 103 103 
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8.16. Appendix: Instruments for Variable Indexes on Factor Analysis 
Factor Index Variables Factor Loading 
(Cronbach α) 
Anti-Immigration 1 Undermine American culture 0.771 
(Reliability Statistics  α = 
0.840) 
Take more than contribute US 0.781 
 Strain on govt. social services 0.805 
 Social values and beliefs 0.845 
 Children not have right to Public 
schools 
0.828 
   
Anti Immigration 2 Should adopt American ways 0.783 
(Reliability Statistics  α = 
0.823) 
Displacing Americans from jobs 0.791 
 Not eligible for health care 0.785 
 Increase Tax Burden  0.787 
 Should conform to American rules 0.793 
   
Climate Change   
(Reliability Statistics  α = 
0.857) 
Climate change dangerous 0.795 
 US not affected 0.780 
 Affect only poor countries 0.825 
 Climate change myth 0.800 
 Science provides little solution 0.913 
   
Disaster Exposure  Affect you directly 0.819 
(Reliability Statistics  α = 
0.900) 
Affect your friends and family 0.819 
 
 
